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MP Wescot-Williams: “The Real Issue Is Not ‘Whose Turn’, it is Institutional Stability, Credibility, and Public Trust.”

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Philipsburg, Sint Maarten – There is once again public contention surrounding the chairmanship of the Central Bank of Curaçao and Sint Maarten (CBCS), specifically regarding the question of “whose turn” it is to propose a candidate. While this debate has generated considerable discussion, it is important to clarify the historical sequence of events and, more importantly, to redirect attention to the substantive challenges facing our monetary union.

Historical Context

In 2017, Etienne Ys was appointed Chairman of the CBCS. His candidacy was recommended by the Supervisory Board of Directors (SBD), and the screening for both countries was conducted through the agencies of Curaçao. At that time, his appointment was generally regarded as Curaçao’s candidate within the rotational understanding between the two countries.

Upon the expiration of his term (2017–2021), the SBD, then signed by Vice-Chair Denis Richardson, recommended Mr. Ys for extension. However, Mr. Ys subsequently withdrew, and the Supervisory Board retracted its recommendation.

During this period, internal disagreements within the CBCS Board intensified. As a result, the Ministers of Finance of Curaçao and Sint Maarten agreed to jointly present a proposal for the chairmanship, effectively bypassing a board recommendation due to the prevailing contention. This approach was communicated to the Court and endorsed. Board members were expected either to resign or to be dismissed.

In December 2021, the SBD proposed Denis Richardson for the position. Both Ministers of Finance agreed to this proposal. Notably, there is no documentation reflecting any dispute over “which country made the proposal.” On the contrary, the Minister of Finance of Curaçao reminded the Minister of Finance of Sint Maarten of the recommendation of Mr. Richardson that was on the table.

At the time, Sint Maarten had not yet amended its National Decree (LBHAM) governing the screening of CBCS officers. Noteworthy in this regard is that in 2017, screenings were conducted by each country’s respective agencies. Following the required procedural steps in Sint Maarten and Curaçao, the screening of Mr. Richardson did not proceed, notwithstanding communication between the current Sint Maarten Finance Minister and the SBD.

Subsequently, faced with a stalemate, the Minister of Finance of Sint Maarten initiated a new nomination process, resulting in the proposal of Jairo Bloem.

Conclusion

Based on documentation:

  • The 2017 appointment of Mr. Ys was recommended by the SBD and regarded as Curaçao’s candidate.
  • The attempt to reappoint Mr. Ys was treated as Sint Maarten’s candidate, but this did not materialize.
  • The SBD then recommended Mr. Richardson as the next Sint Maarten(?) candidate; both Ministers agreed, pending procedural screening, which was never completed.
  • Thereafter, a new nomination process was initiated.

Importantly, the so-called “rotation” of the chairmanship is not legally codified. It has been a matter of practice and political understanding, not statutory obligation. Therefore, framing the current debate as strictly a matter of “whose turn it is” oversimplifies a complex institutional process.

While institutional clarity is important, the greater issue before us is the health and effectiveness of the monetary union itself. Curaçao and Sint Maarten face pressing economic and financial challenges that demand coordinated policy, regulatory stability, and strong governance at the Central Bank.

Public energy would be better directed toward:

  • Addressing structural bottlenecks within the monetary union;
  • Strengthening regulatory oversight and financial sector resilience;
  • Ensuring transparency, credibility, and institutional stability within the CBCS;
  • Safeguarding the shared currency and protecting economic confidence in both countries.

The stability of our monetary union must transcend individual appointments. Leadership matters, but institutional coherence, economic resilience, and public trust matter even more.

Now is the time to move beyond procedural disputes and refocus on strengthening the foundation of our financial systems.